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"My property, even my life, belongs to the Party. This is the quality a Communist must have” 
                   -- Liang Wengen (12 Nov 2012, Guangming Daily) 
   Founder and CEO of the Sany Group  
   The richest person in China in 2011 
   Deputy of the 17th,18th CPC National Congress 
 
I. Introduction 
The spectacular growth of the private sector in China, which started from scratch in the 1990s, is 
well documented. This growth would not be possible to occur without changes in politics. However, 
the sweeping change in political economy associated with this growth is not much studied 
empirically in economics literature. This paper fills in this gap.  
Without a surprise, the first amended version of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) when “the reform” started is unambiguously anti-capitalism. It declares, “[t]he proletariat 
dictatorship will inevitably replace the dictatorship of bourgeoisie…Basically, the socialist 
system has incomparable superiority over the capitalist system …” (The CPC Constitution, 1982). 
Consistently, the reform agenda did not allow for setting up private firms, neither for privatization, 
and the private sector counted for zero percent of the Chinese GDP. But the reform agenda has 
transformed, both the CPC constitution and the state constitution were amended one more time in 
20021 and 2004 respectively, and the institutions were changed (for reasons of these changes see Xu, 
2011). Party members are now encouraged to become private entrepreneurs. As a result, now private 
sector counts for more than half of the Chinese GDP. Moreover, ironically, most of the richest people 
in China are Communist Party members and many of those are selected (not elected) to the People’s 
Congress, the legislator. Yet most striking phenomenon is that China’s National People’s Congress 
becomes far the wealthiest in the world, even with a highly incomplete and heavily underestimated 
data about these elites. The total wealth of the richest 70 People’s Congress members in China is 
US$90 billion, which is 12 times that of the total wealth of all the members in the Congress, the 
Supreme Court and the White House of the U.S., which is US$7.5 billion (Bloomberg, 27/2/2012).  
The central subject of this paper is the political economy nature of the Chinese private sector and of 
the CPC. For this purpose, we examine the dynamics of rent creation from the party membership and 
other political connections when the regime is changed from anti-capitalistic to pro-capitalistic. 
Since the Party is the dominant force both in politics and in the national economy in China (next 
section will elaborate this point), political connections in this paper are captured by a membership of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) or a People’s Congress (PC) membership.2 And we use the 
                                          
1 “We must and we are determined to encourage, support and guide the development of the nonpublic sectors of the econ
omy…’ ‘ nonpublic sectors are important elements of the socialist market economy…”(Jiang Zhemin Speech at the 16th 
CPC National Congress, 2002). 
2 A PC member may not be a CPC member, but he/she must be pro-CPC since all the PC members are selected by the 
CPC. Moreover, in terms of social status and power, an average PC member is at higher level elite than an average CPC 
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terms “political connection” and “political elites” interchangeably. The major questions to be 
addressed are the following. Comparing with non-political elite entrepreneurs, do political elite 
entrepreneurs enjoy rents when they enter the private sector in the old regime (before 2002)? And 
what happened in the new regime (after 2002)? This paper will identify the causality of rents and 
private entrepreneurs’ political connections, and will explore the implications of these political elites’ 
rents for social welfare in terms of productivity.  
There is an extensive literature on the relationships between political connections and economic 
variables. A group of economists investigate the economic value of political connections. In a 
seminal paper, Fisman (2001) finds that the Suharto’s health-related events caused significant loss in 
the return on the price of the securities of politically connected firms. By extending the scope of 
investigation to 47 countries, Faccio (2006) suggests that the announcement of entering politics by 
officers or large shareholders of a company is positively associated with cumulative abnormal return 
which varies depending upon political power. This line of research applied to various countries in 
different settings: late Victorian Britain (Braggion and Moore, 2011), a longitudinal dataset of Italian 
companies (Cingano and Pinotti, 2009), Russia’s politically connected firms receiving preferential 
treatments by regional laws and regulations (Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2005), and U.S. 
firms connected to Geithner as a nominee for Treasury Secretary by President Obama (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Kermani, 2010). 
Another group looks at the effect of political connections on access to bank loans and government 
subsidies. Using data from Pakistan, Khwaja and Mian (2005) claim that politically-connected firms 
are able to borrow 45 percent more but they are more likely to default by 50 percent in comparison 
with ones without political connections. Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnell (2006)’s findings support that political connections affect government or bank decisions. 
The former presents results that the decision on government subsidies is associated with political 
connections while the latter shows that politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out.   
A multiple number of sociological studies document the potential advantages of being a party 
member in China. Evidence documented by Walder (2000) shows that joining the party is a 
necessary condition to become a leader in China. Li and Walder (2001) find that joining the Party at 
earlier careers makes the difference. In more detail, those who have become a party member at early 
time of their careers are found to have significantly higher chances to become social elites while 
those who are already successful before joining the Party would not make the difference in their 
career by joining the Party. Bian (2001) suggests that everything being equal, i.e. controlling for 
talents and education/experience backgrounds etc., Party members have higher chances than non-
Party members to become top managers in state-owned firms. By investigating the changes after the 
massive purges of the “Cultural Revolution”, Walder and Hu (2009) find that party elites, particularly 
their offspring, recovered much more quickly than others.  




Political connections and their associated economic performance among Chinese firms have attracted 
attention from economists. Using the listed firms, Fan et.al (2007) show that firms with politically 
connected top executives of newly partially privatized firms are less efficient than others in terms of 
post-IPO performance. In contrast, Peng and Luo (2007) and Francis et.al (2009) use listed data to 
show that political ties are beneficial to firms in terms of obtaining resources but these are efficiency 
enhancing. Li et al. (2008) find the positive effect of political connection on firm performance using 
one year cross-sectional data of private firms collected in 2002. Chen et al (2011) and Wu et al (2012) 
document the heterogeneous effects of political connections: performance of SOEs is negatively 
affected while that of private firms little or positively by political connections. Unlike works using 
cross sectional differences among Chinese firms, Calomiris, Fisman and Wang (2010) apply the 
event study method to firm level data, and find that the policy announcement of the sale of 
government-owned shares received a negative response in stock markets but the cancellation of such 
policy a symmetric a positive response.     
Our project complements the literature in the following ways: First, it is the first paper that studies 
the change or the dynamics of political economy of Chinese private firms. Our approach provides a 
more credible identification of the impact of political connections on firm performance by showing 
that it depends critically on institutional settings, such as changes in constitutions. To our best 
knowledge, none of the current literature except Calomiris, Fisman and Wang (2010) looks at 
dynamics of the effects of political connections on economic variables.3 Second, this paper carefully 
addresses the endogeneity and identification problem. We instrument the Party members by the 
existence of party branches or party organizations within the firm. In addition, we use part of the data 
to exclude new party members from the sample to deal with reversed causality. We also show 
evidence about those who want to join the Party to further resolve the identification problem. Finally, 
the data we use, many years of nationwide random sampling survey firm level data of Chinese 
private sector in the years of 1995, 2000, 2006 and 2010, is unique in the literature.  
Our major findings are summarized in the following. First, the politically connected elites did not 
enjoy statistically detectable rents before the amendment in Constitutions in 2002-2004. However, 
following the changes in Constitutions that recognized the private sector, political connections 
became a major determinant of access to bank loans. Second, political connections failed to improve 
firm performance. Rather, they are positively associated with paying themselves in a form of 
dividends.       
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the institutional background 
about the Communist Party vis-à-vis the private sector. Section III discusses institutional background 
surrounding the amendment in the Constitution. Section IV introduces the data and provides the 
basic observations. Section IV shows our baseline results. Section V addresses the endogeneity and 
                                          
3 A main difference between our paper and Calomiris, Fisman and Wang (2010) is that we look at a more fundamental 
change in Constitution on private property rights while the latter focuses on policy change on the sales of government-
owned shares. In addition, Calomiris, Fisman and Wang (2010) apply the event study method that requires the efficiency 
of Chinese financial markets and the unexpected policy change. Our method using cross-sectional comparisons of firms 
across different periods do not need such assumptions.    
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the identification problem using an instrumental variable approach and excluding the sample that 
might be affected by reverse causality. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Institutional Background 
 
It is well documented that the backbone of China’s institution is the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
(Xu, 2011). The Party controls all levels of governments, which directly determines or deeply 
influences the allocation of local resources, through personnel control. Moreover the party 
determines the appointments of all the most important posts in the state sector, like the CEOs and 
presidents of the major banks and largest state-owned enterprises. Almost all important posts are 
occupied by party members. The rest are occupied by party-trusted non-party members. Thus, being 
a party member, particularly being a veteran party member, facilitates opportunities for political 
connections, which can be used for business. This is particularly true for those who purposely 
cultivate the connections. Furthermore, the Party controls all levels of the legislature, the People’s 
Congress, from the national down to county, mostly through influences of selecting members of the 
congress. Literally, all non-party congress members must be party-trusted persons.    
The Communist Party launched economic reform since 1978. The private sector was not allowed 
under the communist rule and a change in this policy was not in the reform agenda. The major 
development of private sector and privatization occurred after the mid-1990s when the state sector 
was in deep troubles (Xu, 2011). Once had a chance to grow, the private sector took off rapidly. From 
1998 to 2005 the output of private sector increased by 20 times, and the share of the private sector in 
total GDP increased from only 2.5% in 1998 to nearly 50% in 2009, so it becomes the largest sector 
in the Chinese economy.  
Becoming the major engine of Chinese economy out of reform agenda, the very fast growth of 
private sector surprised the party. From 1998 to 2002, when the private sector has expanded by six 
folds, the Party’s presence in terms of the number of members in the private sector was shrinking. 
The official nationwide statistics shows, the share of the party membership in the private sector 
declined by more than 36%, from 2.8% in 1995 to 1.7% in 2002 (Table 1). This is echoed by the fact 
that in the year 2000 only 17% of private firms in our sample have party organizations within the 
firm.4  
These conflicting consequences between a fast economic growth resulted from the abrupt progress of 
private economy and the sign of the ruling party’s losing representation in the private sector are due 
to the self-conflicting institutions, which put private business in an illegal status or at least a 
disadvantageous status.   
                                          
4 In 2004 the Financial Times reported that in Shanghai only 1.1% of the private firms had party organizations. One 
should keep in mind that the average size of the firms in our sample is larger than the average size of the firms in the 
population, thus it is over representing the firms which have established party branches.   
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Facing a fast growing private sector, which is rocking the social foundation of the CPC, Jiang Zemin, 
the Chairman of the Party and the President of the state, challenged the constitutions of the party and 
of the state. In his inspection tour in Guangdong province at the beginning of year 2000, he 
proclaimed that entrepreneurs should be recognized as “advanced productive force” (The CPC 
Maoming City Propaganda Department, 2002)5, that party members should be encouraged to become 
entrepreneurs and the Party should legitimately recruit entrepreneurs in a large scale. Two years later 
at the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party this principle is codified into the 
constitution of the party. Following this change, in 2004, the constitution of the state was also 
amended that the Chinese government will recognize and protect private property rights. 
Contradicting Marxism, the core spirit of communist ideology, this is the first time in the 
international communist movement history that capitalists are explicitly embraced by a communist 
party both ideologically and organizationally. This change not only reflects the Chinese Communist 
Party’s recognition of the growing importance of the private sector to China’s economy, but more 
importantly, it is a change of institution, and a change of business environment.  
It is well-publicized that a large number of party elites have entered the private sector since the 
changes of constitutions. Our data confirms this (Table 3). It is also widely reported or alleged that 
political elites benefit from the political connections they have for obtaining scarce resources when 
they become private entrepreneurs. Furthermore, many non-party member entrepreneurs under the 
new environment might love to be recruited by the party-state (either joining the party or try hard to 
become a congressman), since by doing so they may improve their chances of accessing scarce 
resources.  
The central question to be addressed by this paper is the impact of the change of laws and institutions 
on the relationship between political connections and economic rents. This dynamics is unexplored 
in the existing literature. The first question is, comparing with commoners do political elites enjoy 
rents when they enter the private sector in the old regime? And the same question for the new regime. 
Moreover, how did the relationship between political connections and economic rents evolve from 
the old regime to the new regime?  
From our data, which are collected from nationwide random sampling surveys over 15 years, we find 
in the period of 1995 and 2000, the Party social elites did not enjoy statistically detectable rents. 
Controlled for all other factors (e.g. characteristics of individual, firm, industry and location etc.), the 
resources (such as bank loans) that they obtained are not different from other entrepreneurs. However, 
the political rent became significant. In 2006 and 2010 firms owned by Party members associated 
social elites obtained significantly more bank loans than others.  
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
                                          
5 The term “productive force” is a central concept in Marxism. The productive forces consist of means of production, 
and labor power. The central argument of Marxism is that advanced productive forces determine the progress of an 




The major data set used in this paper is four cross-sectional surveys on private sector in China. These 
surveys were conducted in 1995, 2000, 2006, and 2010 through face-to-face interviews. The survey 
questionnaires and sampling schemes were designed by a research team which involved economists 
and sociologists from the CAAS and some Chinese universities. The survey series was organized by 
a CPC central committee department, the United Front Work Department, and two ministry level 
central government agencies, The National Association of Industry and Commerce, and The State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce. This survey series is the largest of this kind in China that 
it has traced the development of the private sector nationwide since the sector emerges from scratch.    
To make the survey be representative to the population of nationwide registered private firms, a 
stratified random sampling procedure is applied. The stratifications include locations, industries, 
stages of economic development, and distribution of the private firms in urban and rural areas within 
each location (a city or a county). The surveys covered more than one third of the cities in China. 
The sample size of the 1995 survey is 2,869, which are located in 160 cities; 3,073 from 129 cities 
for the survey in 2000; 3,837 from 109 cities for 2006; and 4,624 from 158 cities for 2010.  
Tables 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B are the summary statistics of the firms’ financial data over the four survey 
years. The statistics show that by average firms owned by CPC or PC members are larger than those 
by non CPC/PC owners in terms of sales, number of employees, and the value of equity for all the 
years. It is also noteworthy that by average CPC member owners and PC member owners obtain 
more bank loans (measured by bank loan to equity ratio) than other owners for the years of 2006 and 
2010.   
 
IV. Political Connections, Rents, and Firm Performance 
 
Political Connections and Rents 
 
The amendments of the Constitution of the party (the CPC) in 20026 and of the Constitution of the 
state (the PRC) in 20047 have transformed institutional settings for economic agents in China. 
Before the amendments, private entrepreneurship was not legal by state constitution and was in 
direct conflict with the party’s ideology and policy. Chinese private enterprises were formally 
discriminated against state-owned ones in terms of access to bank loan and other resources (Brendt 
and Li, 2003). For anyone with political capital, e.g. a PC member or a veteran party member 
                                          
6 The key of this amendment is to recognize private entrepreneurs’ legitimate social status and encourage private 
entrepreneurship.  
7 The key of this amendment is to recognize and protect private ownership, including private businesses.  
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working in a government agency or SOE, consider to convert his/her –self to become a private 
entrepreneur, he/she needed to weigh between the political/economic risks and economic gains, 
which might only be temporary.  
In contrast, after the amendments of the two constitutions, when private entrepreneurship becomes 
legitimate and is encouraged, the risks and benefits for becoming an entrepreneur might be changed, 
at least formally. Moreover, given the monopolistic position of the government in controlling 
resources, those PC members or veteran party members might gain access to resources from their 
political connections. Hence, we hypothesize that, the period of 2003-2004 is a turning point that 
political connections became a significant factor in determining business advantages for those with 
connections, whereas was unlike before the period.   
Potentially, one of the important advantages for political elites in running private businesses than 
commoners is access to bank loans. On the one hand, the majority of the bank loans are issued by the 
State-owned banks and the interest rates are set by the government. In this case, it means the 
government has a lot say on the allocation of the credit. On the other hand, bank loans are heavily 
subsidized such that the cost of capital and other important input factors in China are among the 
lowest in the world. Starting from 2003, the cost of capital in China became the lowest in the world 
from 2004 (Lardy, 2012). Consequently, whoever is able to obtain bank loans enjoys the rent, enjoys 
subsidies. In order to test whether a significant change occurred after the amendment in the 
Constitution, “access to bank loans” is regressed against “CPC/PC membership” for four cross-
sections, i.e. 1995, 2000, 2006 and 2010. The definitions of the variables used in estimations are 
presented in Appendix (Table A1).   
We measure political connections by CPC and PC membership, and estimate the effects of CPC/PC 
memberships on bank loans employing two measurements. The first one is derived from the answer 
to the question on whether the firm has bank loans, yes or no. The second one is the ratio of total 
bank loans over the value of total equity. The former variable is available for all the four years while 
the latter only for the years of 2000, 2006 and 2010. Tables 6 and 7 show the estimation results using 
the two measurements respectively. In each table, we conduct regressions using both yearly data and 
the pooled data. For the latter, we test whether the interaction term between political membership and 
period (0: pre-amendment period, 1: post-amendment period) is significant.    
Table 4 indicates that CPC membership is positively and significantly correlated with bank loan only 
for the post-amendment period, i.e. years of 2006 and 2010 (columns (5)-(8)). Moreover, the 
interaction term between CPC and period is also significant in the pooled regressions (columns (9) 
and (10)). All of these results suggest that political connections resulted in better access to bank loan 
only for the period of 2006 and 2010. Similar results are obtained from OLS estimations using the 
bank-loan over total-equity ratio. As shown in Table 5, a firm owned by a CPC member gained 
significantly more bank loans measured by the ratio in 2006 and 2010 (columns (3)-(6)) but not in 
2000 (column (1)) comparing to a firm owned by non-CPC member.  
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The impact of the PC membership on access to bank-loans follows the same pattern as that of the 
CPC membership. Yet, there is one notable difference between the two groups. In both Tables 4 and 
5, although insignificant for the year 1995 (column (2) in Table 4), the same as for CPC membership, 
PC membership is significant in determining bank loans for the year 2000 (column (4) in Table 4 and 
column (2) in Table 5). Moreover, the magnitude of the effects and the coefficient of the significance 
are larger than those of CPC membership. These results may reflect the fact that PC members are 
higher level elites than CPC members. Thus, they might be able to take advantage of their more 
prestigious position and better information earlier and faster than CPC members. When Jiang Zemin 
proclaimed recognizing entrepreneurs at the beginning of year 2000, many of them might be 
informed about the profound political/economic meaning of this. Thus, some of them already moved 
ahead before the laws are formally changed. Moreover, with more prestigious position and deeper 
political connections they are more likely to enjoy greater benefits than CPC members.        
It is a natural concern that our results might also be driven by some other factors between the 
entrepreneur/firm and the government, e.g. a connection with the government regardless of party 
membership or connections with the government inherited in the case of privatized SOEs.8 In order 
to rule out these concerns, in the above-mentioned regressions we controlled two related variables. 
First, we controlled the previous working experience of the entrepreneur. This is a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the entrepreneur once worked as a civil servant or a manager in a SOE, or, 
served in the army before he started up the private business and equals to zero if otherwise. As 
shown in Table 4, indeed, having worked in government-related agencies increased the probability of 
the entrepreneur to gain bank loan access for the firm in 2006 and 2010. At the same time, according 
to Table 5, these working experiences of the entrepreneur are significantly and positively associated 
with the firm’s bank loan over equity ratio in 2006. As our results stand, yet, the effects of the CPC 
membership and PC membership of the entrepreneur stay robust after controlling the previous 
working experience of the entrepreneur.  
Secondly, we also controlled whether the firm was privatized from a SOE for the year 2006 and 2010 
(these data are unavailable for earlier years). According to our estimates, the privatized firms do not 
seem be different from the de novo firms in bank loan access. Again, controlling this variable does 
not affect the impacts of the CPC membership and PC membership of the entrepreneur on the firm’s 
bank loan access.  
 
Political Connections and Firm Performance  
  
                                          
8 Staring from the late 1990s, there was a strong wave of privatization of SOEs in China (Guo et al., 2010). A concern is 




The findings of previous section imply rent-seeking in bank credits for the entrepreneurs with 
political connections. An interesting question to be addressed is wether the rents are productive 
enhancing or not. If the answer is yes, then the consequence of rent-seeking is mainly inequality; and 
a remedy policy might be designed to correct this distortion. As a result, the Chinese-style capitalism 
may be sustainable. However, if the answer is no, if political connections have little influence on 
firm performance but enrich politically-connected entrepreneurs, it means the rent-seeking leads to 
social welfare losses and there is little economic justification. If so, prevalence and growing of this 
kind of unjustified rent-seeking could lead to undermine political support for Chinese-style 
capitalism.  
In this section, we will explore the social welfare implications of the rents. The key is to find out if 
the CPC/PC member-owned firms perform better than others. In case they are not, then a question of 
interest is what they do with the bank loans that they obtained.   
The existing discussions on the effect of political connections on firm performance in China are 
divided. Fan et al (2007) suggest that political connections hurt firm performance but Li et al (2008) 
and Francis et.al (2009) find their positive impacts on firm performance. Recent papers by Chen et al 
(2011) and Wu et al (2012) highlight that political connections affect firms differently depending on 
whether the firm is state-owned or private-owned.9 
We measure the performance of private firms as return on equity (ROE) for the period of 1995-2010. 
In our regressions, we controlled broad range of variables related to CEOs and firms, which may 
affect firm performance. For example, the CEO share of investment can exert influence on firm 
performance through managerial incentives. Table 6 shows that political connections are not 
correlated with firm performance measured by ROE, in all the four years. Controlled characteristics 
of firm-owners and firms, and finance of the firm, neither CPC membership nor PC membership 
have significant impact to performance in any of the years (columns (1)-(8)) and in all the years 
when we pool the data together (columns (9)-(10)).10  
To explore how political connections affect performance via the channel of bank loans, we include 
the interaction term between bank loans and CPC/PC membership in the regressions.11 It is not 
surprise that in the years of 1995 and 2000, when political connections did not lead to obtaining more 
                                          
9 Except Li et al (2008), which measure political connection using CPC membership, the other papers such as Fan et al 
(2007), Chen et al (2011), Wu et al (2012) define a politically-connected firm as one whose CEO or Chairman is a 
current or former government official.  
10 The seemingly different results between this paper and Li et al (2008) are likely due to the following reasons. a) We 
use different data than Li et al (2008), which is based on the data of year 2002. Given data of year 2002 reflect the 
business environment before the change of constitution, the operations in that year should be more similar to that of year 
2000, and not surprise should be significantly different from those of year 2006 and 2010. b) We deploy more control 
variables than theirs. For example, CEO share of investment is significant for most years, but their paper does not control 
this. c) They use leverage in all regressions, which is likely to be correlated with CPC membership. 
11 We find bank loans have positive impact on performance. This is in line with existing studies (Khwaja and Mian, 200
5; Claessens et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008). 
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bank loans, these interaction terms are all insignificant (columns (1)-(4)). However, for the other 
years, the CPC and bank-loan interaction term is negative and significant in 2006 (column (5)) but 
insignificant in 2010 (column 7); the PC and bank-loan interaction term is insignificant in 2006 
(column (6)) but positive and significant in 2010 (column 8), and the magnitude is small. When we 
pool all the cross section data together, we obtain similar results (column (9)-(10)).  
Overall, we can conclude that political connections failed to lead to better performance. Although 
there are some positive effects of political connections on firm performance for CPC members when 
they obtained bank loan, the effects are found only for 2010 and the size is small. If the elite owners 
borrowed more from banks but did not perform better, a natural question arises is the way resources 
used.  
To address this question, we investigate personal gains of the elite owners from their firms. Given 
elite entrepreneurs own at least 60% of total shares of equity in their firms (Tables 2-3), paying 
dividends could be an effective channel to benefit from the resources they obtained. A major feature 
of Chinese private firms is that most of them do not regularly distribute dividends. This is partly 
because the difficulties in accessing bank loans, which forces them rely on self-financing, e.g. from 
re-investing accumulated profits of their firms. In Table 7 we look at factors which may affect firms’ 
decision on either to pay dividends, with a particular attention to political connections of the firm 
owners.  
Our overall estimates are clear cut when we pool all the cross-sectional data together. The elites are 
more likely to pay dividends to themselves than other entrepreneurs, as shown in columns (9) and 
(10) of Table 7. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 show that CPC/PC memberships has insignificant 
impact to distribution of dividends in year 1995. However, as shown in columns (3), (5) and (7), 
firms owned by CPC members are significantly more likely to pay dividends than other firms in 
years 2000, 2006 and 2010. What happened in 2000 is particularly problematic since in that year 
they did not obtain more bank loans (column (4) of Table 4 and column (2) of Table 5), and the 
interaction term between CPC-membership and bank loan plays a negative and significant role in 
performance of their firms (column (4) of Table 6).  
These findings indicate serious problems in resource allocation of the Chinese economy. Looks like 
bank loans in the hand of politically-connected private firms are used less efficiently than those 
without political connections. The Chinese Communist Party encouraged its elites to enter the private 
sector to strengthen its grip on the economy and the society, but, as a result, economic efficiency 
sacrificed as economic power has acquired political influence and used it mainly for their own 
benefits. In other words, since the change in the Constitution, economic rents and thus inefficiency 
have increased because those who have political connections obtained more resources but failed to 
improve firm performance. In a typical capitalist economy, entrepreneurs have the incentives to re-
invest (Smith, 1776), and thus increases in bank loans likely lead to more investment. This has been 
systematically documented all over the world. However, our findings imply this is not the case in 
Chinese politically connected entrepreneurs. Instead, our findings indicate losses from distorted 




V. Robustness Check: Dealing Endogeneity 
 
There may be different interpretations of the above-shown correlations. For example, when we use 
party membership as an independent variable, we implicitly assume its exogeneity to outcomes. 
However, it is not very likely that this is true. It might be possible that more successful entrepreneurs 
are recruited into the Party. In this case, there would be a positive correlation between party 
membership and firm performance and the nature of the story might be changed. Moreover, some 
worse-performing entrepreneurs might join the Party if he thought failing in business was due to lack 
of political connections. In this case there would be a negative correlation between party membership 
and firm performance. If both cases appear, the overall effects of the two could cancelled out, and 
could might drive the result that there is no performance difference between the elite owned firms 
and other firms. The other potential problem is that party membership might be positively related 
with ability. Capable individuals might have become party members and also successful 
entrepreneurs. Consequently, firm performance or bank loans are affected not by party membership 
itself but by ability which is conveyed in the variable of party membership. Indeed we have 
controlled entrepreneurs’ characteristics, including capabilities, as much as we can. Still, there are 
omitted factors. 
We address these problems in the following aspects. The first is to apply an instrument-variable 
approach. The second approach is to directly exploit the data by excluding the party member 
recruited after starting up a private business. This allows us to exclude endogeneity that an owner of 
a private enterprise purposefully became a party member in order to increase accessibility to bank 
loan. This also helps to sharpen our estimates by focusing on the veteran Party members, i.e. the true 
political elites that are senior enough. Thirdly, we are going to investigate the qualifications of 
entrepreneurs who want to join the Party. Through this channel, we can figure out whether they are 
better performers or not. Lastly, we examine if the reason that CPC/PC member owners borrow more 
bank loans is due to extra financial constraints than others. If so, it might be somewhat justifiable. 
We start from the instrument-variable approach. We instrument entrepreneurs’ party membership by 
the existence of party branches within the firms. A good instrument should satisfy two conditions: 
relevance and exogeneity. We believe that party organization within the firm satisfies these two 
conditions. First, it can be relevant to our key variables, CPC and PC memberships, because if the 
firm owner is a Party member or PC member, he/ she will have more incentives and also easier to set 
up a party branch. In the following we are going to further elaborate this point. Second, it is likely to 
be exogenous to dependent variable such as bank loan or firm performance.  
Under the rule of Communist Party of China and socialist ownership (i.e. no private ownership 
allowed), all firms and business units in China must have party branches until the appearance of 
private firms in the 1990s. When the private sector becomes significant in the national economy, the 
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fact that these firms do not have CPC’s grassroots’ branches12 has drawn serious concerns from the 
party. In response, the CPC central committee issued a decree in September 2000, which asks all the 
private firms set up grassroots party branches.13 Therefore, if an owner is a veteran party member, 
under the request of the party and to keep good political connections with the party, he/she should be 
more likely to set up a party branch in his/her own firm than non-party member entrepreneurs. The 
same should also be true for the PC members, at least for those who are also party members, since 
they are political elites at higher up levels, which means they would follow closer to the party’s 
appeals. These are all statistically confirmed in the first-stage regressions.     
In the first stage, we look at how the CPC or PC membership of the owners is determined by the 
existence of party branch in their firms, the instrument variable, together with a set of control 
variables. The results displayed in the Table 8b confirm that party branch is highly significant in 
determining an owner’s CPC/PC membership.14 In addition, Wald test statistic shows it is highly 
relevant.  
Table 8a presents estimation results of the second stage, where CPC or PC membership are 
instrumented using the predicted value of the first stage regressions. Panel (a) of Table 8 shows that 
that both CPC and PC memberships are positively and significantly correlated with the bank loan to 
equity ratio.15 This establishes the causality that political connections lead to easy access to bank 
loans. Moreover, if we compare the 2SLS estimates (columns (1) - (4) in Table 8a) with the OLS 
estimates (columns (1) - (4) in Table 5), it is clear that both statistically and economically the 
significant levels of the 2SLS estimates are much higher than the OLS estimates. It indicates that the 
OLS estimates may under-estimate the benefits of the connections.   
To further confirm the causality, our second approach is to focus only at veteran party members by 
using a subsample of the data and excluding other data. This eliminates all the party members who 
join the party after starting private business. Unfortunately, this kind of data is only available in 2006. 
Table 9 presents estimation results.  
We have two sets of data measuring bank loans. One is banks loans for the four largest banks and the 
other is the total amount of bank loans. The upper panel is the result of OLS regressions and the 
lower panel is the result from the 2SLS. In the 2SLS regressions, the CPC/PC memberships are 
                                          
12 In the 2000 only 17% of private firms in our sample have party branches. In 2004 the Financial Times reported that in 
Shanghai only 1.1% of the private firms had party branches. 
13 The decree is entitled “The provisions on strengthening grassroots Party branches in private and non-state-owned 
enterprises (guan-yu zai ge-ti he si-ying deng fei-gong-you-zhi jingji zhuzhi zhong jiaqiang dang de jianshe gongzuo de 
yijian (shixing)).” It emphasizes the importance of the Party’s leadership and influence in non-state-owned enterprises. 
Concretely, it requested all private firms with more than three CPC members to establish grassroots branches. Moreover, 
it appeals city and county party committees send party representatives to firms with less than three CPC members, 
particularly large private firms, to attract more people to join the party and to guide them set up grassroots party branches. 
14 Summary statistics between party organizations and its owners as party members and People’s Congress members are 
presented in appendix. 
15 The reason we only look at 2006 and 2010 is because only in these two years the political elites get more bank loans. 
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instrumented in the same way as in Table 8, i.e. by the existence of party branches in the firm. 
Columns (1) and (2) are for the Party members, and (3) and (4) are for Congress members. The 
results show that both CPC and PC memberships are significant in all OLS and 2SLS regressions. 
This further confirms that the veteran party members, who are more likely to be senior elites, obtain 
more bank loans than others. 
In the next step, we are going to address a question concerning the motive of borrowing more bank 
loans by politically connected entrepreneurs. Concretely, when the party-member owners obtain 
more bank loans than others, did they face more financial constraints than others? If so, the extra 
bank loans they obtained should rather be interpreted as neediness to deal with financial difficulties. 
To address this matter, we use borrowing from informal financial sector as a proxy to measure 
financial constraints. The reason this is a valid proxy to measure the financial constraints of a firm is 
because the high interest rates and the legal risks associated with the loans in that sector.16 Firms 
without serious financial constraints tend to avoid this kind of high-cost high-risk loans.  
Table 10 shows regressions results for the three years (1995, 2000, and 2006) (no relevant data 
available for 2010). From all the cross-sections and pooled data, we find no evidence that the CPC 
and PC membership of the firm owners involve different informal lending activities than others. 
Together with the evidence that these firms are more likely to distribute dividends than other firms, 
all of these findings indicate that they are not financially more constrained than the others. 
The last question we are going to address in this paper is what types of entrepreneurs were recruited 
into the party? Are those recruited into the party performed better or worse than others? In the 
questionnaires of 2006 and 2010, we have the data on those who indicated that they want to join the 
party. In the regressions shown in Table 11, we look at the correlation between those who want to 
join the party and their performance, which is measured by the return-over-sales ratio (ROS) in the 
past years (this is the only data available for tracking down their past performance). Overall it is clear 




Most existing studies on political connections looked at their relationships with firm performance in 
a static setting. The amendment in the Chinese Constitution in 2002-2004 presents an important 
                                          
16 In China, financial sector is highly regulated. Informal lending in almost any form is illegal. Nonetheless, informal 
lending has surged as small businesses are often eschewed by the nation's major state-owned banks, which lend mainly to 
major state-owned enterprises (WSJ, March 14, 2012). According to UBS’s report, informal loans could be between two 
trillion yuan and four trillion yuan in total, or $316 billion to $632 billion, a bit less than 10% of the country's gross 
domestic product in 2011. Without legal protection, entrepreneurs who borrow informal loans not only take legal risks 
but also pay a reported annualized lending rate of 14%-70% for loans (reported by Credit Suisse, Spet, 2011). 
17 In the pooled regression in Column (7), ROS (t-1) and ROS (t-2) are significant but the sign and the magnitudes of the 
coefficients suggest the effects are cancelled out.   
15 
 
opportunity to analyze the effects of political connections on resource allocations and firm 
performance in a dynamic setting, by looking at what happened before and after major changes of 
laws and institutional settings.  
Our results suggest that politically connected entrepreneurs did not have much rent-seeking 
opportunities when the private sector was not appreciated by the party and the constitutions. 
However, after the laws and institutions were changed, the political elite entrepreneurs were treated 
differently, although these changes might not be written down in the law and might not be formal. 
What we discovered is that rent-seeking opportunities now became available. Concretely, we find 
everything else being equal these entrepreneurs could obtain more bank loans than others. Moreover, 
with more low-cost financial resources they did not perform better than others. Instead, we find 
politically-connected entrepreneurs are more likely to pay dividends to themselves than other 
entrepreneurs. 
In addition to these discoveries, methodologically, this paper uses four cross-section data. Not only 
this is necessary for dealing with dynamics, this multiple cross-section data also reduce the omitted 
variable bias which is caused frequently in a single-year cross-section analysis due to the 
uncontrolled association between political connections and an omitted variable. Moreover, we have 
addressed endogeneity problem carefully by deploying instrument variable approach and several 
other approaches. Furthermore, our instrument variable, the existence of party branches within a firm, 
not only solves causality problem, but also reveals an interesting mechanism of party-firm 
relationship.   
Our findings imply that the rents enjoyed by politically connected entrepreneurs lead to inefficiencies 
and unjustifiable collusion of economic power with political influence in China. What is the 
implication of this phenomenon to Chinese economic growth? What are the implications of these to 
the citizens, the ruling party, and the social stability? These are important open questions to be 
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Table 1: Growth of China’s Private Sector and the Share of CPC Members  


















1998 2082.9 2.47 3.07 32.37 2.76 
1999 3244.6 3.62 4.46 32.37 2.40 
2000 5220.4 5.26 6.09 31.89 2.29 
2001 8760.9 7.99 9.18 32.63 1.86 
2002 12950.9 10.76 11.69 31.88 1.70 
2003 20980.2 15.45 14.75 29.09 3.08 
2004 35141.3 21.98 17.42 28.26 3.60 
2005 47778.2 25.83 18.99 27.95 3.87 
2006 67239.8 31.08 21.24 27.75 4.15 
2007 94023.3 35.37 23.21 27.40 4.55 
2008 136340.3 43.41 26.87 27.17 4.71 
2009 162026.2 47.58 29.55 - - 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2010; Selected Statistics of Communist Party of China, 1921-2010, 





Table 2A Summary Statistics for 1995 
 CPC Owner PC Owner Non CPC/PC Owner Full Sample 
Variables         Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Age of firm  4.32 2.64 5.9 4.26 4.53 3.66 4.61  3.72  
State share (%)  1.2  5.4  1.02 4.98 0.68 3.97 0.77  4.27  
CEO share (%)  89.9 23.0  87.7 25.2 92.0 20.5 91.4  21.0  
Sales (RMB mil)  6.7  19.6  11.9 23.9 5.3 14.1 5.6  14.9  
No. of employees  104.0  177.3  160.7 224.9 80.7 149.9 85.0  153.2  
Equity (RMB mil) 2.7 7.1 4.8 10.6 2.1 6.3 2.4 6.8 
Donation/ Profit (%)  2.4  3.6  2.6 3.4 2.3 3.5 2.3  3.6  
Forced Fee/ Profit (%) 1.8  3.1  1.9 3.2 1.8 3.1 1.8  3.1  
PR Fee/ Profit (%)  5.3  6.8  5.0 5.3 5.3 6.1 5.4  6.3  
ROE  0.62  1.19  0.68 1.27 0.68 1.34 0.65  1.27  
ROA  0.18 0.25  0.17 0.26 0.21 0.34 0.21  0.32  
 
 
Table 2B: Summary Statistics for 2000 
 CPC Owner PC Owner Non CPC/PC Owner Full Sample 
Variables         Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Age of firm  5.82 3.86 6.80 4.21 6.51 5.9 6.48 4.00 
State share (%)  0.3 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.3 
CEO share (%)  72.6 30.4 75.5 28.8 81.0 25.6 78.2 27.7 
Sales (RMB mil)  18.6 39.8 28.2 49.8 9.9 26.9 15.9 37.0 
No. of employees  216.3 636.6 319.3 730.2 92.5 230.9 171.1 637.2 
Equity (RMB mil) 9.4 21.3 13.7 26.2 4.5 12.8 7.8 19.7 
Bank loan/Equity (%) 0.6 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.8 
Donation/sales (%) 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 
Forced Fee/sales (%) 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.5 1.1 
PR Fee/sales (%) 1.1 1.7 0.8 1.4 1.4 2.1 1.3 2.0 
ROS 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
ROA 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 







Table 3A: Summary Statistics for 2006 
 CPC Owner PC Owner Non CPC/PC Owner Full Sample 
Variables         Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Age of firm  7.4  4.4  8.4 4.5 6.6 4.3 7.04  4.4  
State share (%)  0.8  4.9  0.6 3.6 0.3 2.9 0.5  3.8  
CEO share (%)  64.5  28.3  67.3 26.6 70.2 25.4 68.2  26.7  
Sales (RMB mil)  53.9  118.6  86.9 145.7 21.4 57.3 39.2  96.8  
No. of employees  209.1  423.5  357.1 548.5 106.0 262.5 157.9  348.7  
Equity (RMB mil) 12.2  24.6  20.6 32.6 7.1 18.6 10.2  22.6  
Bank loan/Equity (%) 0.7  1.7  0.9 1.8 0.4 1.2 0.6  1.5  
Land/ Equity (%) 9.6  14.7  10.8 14.3 6.9 13.7 8.3  14.3  
Donation/sales (%) 0.4  1.1  0.5 1.3 0.6 1.3 0.5  1.2  
Forced Fee/sales (%) 0.5 1.4 0.5 1.6 0.8 2.0 0.7 1.7 
PR Fee/sales (%) 1.1 2.5 1.0 2.5 1.6 3.2 1.4  2.9 
ROS 0.1  0.2  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1  0.2  
ROE 0.3  0.6  0.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3  0.6  
 
Table 3B: Summary Statistics for 2010 
 CPC Owner PC Owner Non CPC/PC Owner Full Sample 
Variables         Mean S.D Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Age of firm  8.9  4.5  10.2 4.2 7.9 4.7 8.7  4.7  
State share (%)  0.4  3.8  0.3 2.8 0.2 2.8 0.3  3.3  
CEO share (%)  61.7  29.5  64.3 28.7 67.3 28.2 65.2  28.8  
Sales (RMB mil)  74.9  182.3  122.6 242.1 33.1 114.4 57.8  160.1  
No. of employees  198.4  381.0  320.1 491.8 94.3 255.3 157.2  341.3  
Equity (RMB mil) 21.8  46.8  35.6 59.9 10.1 33.1 17.4  42.5  
Bank loan/Equity (%) 0.9  2.5  1.1 2.5 0.7 2.0 0.8  2.3  
Land/ Equity (%) 6.6  12.2  8.1 12.8 5.9 12.8 6.3  12.5  
Donation/sales (%) 0.6  1.9  0.8 2.2 0.5 1.4 0.6  1.8  
Forced Fee/sales (%) 0.9  2.6  0.7 2.5 0.6 2.1 0.7  2.3  
PR Fee/sales (%) 1.9  5.0  1.7 5.1 2.4 6.1 2.1  5.5  
ROS 0.1  0.2  0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1  0.2  






Table 4: Logit Regression on Whether the Firm Has Bank Loans 
 
 
1995 2000 2006 2010 Pooled 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Owner C. 
CPC membr .125 .071 .191*** .146** 
(.133) (.081) (.072) (.062) 
PC membr .018 .215** .354*** .479*** 





Gender -.153 -.103 -.162 -.064 -.184* -.258*** -.027 -.012 -.279*** -.292*** 
(.157) (.164) (.101) (.124) (.104) (.099) (.089) (.095) (.087) (.092) 
Edu .017 .030 -.018* -.006 .005 .005 .008 -.002 .025** .018 
(.019) (.021) (.011) (.015) (.014) (.013) (.012) (.013) (.011) (.012) 
Age -.009 -.006 -.009** -.012** -.009* -.008* -.004 -.001 -.008** -.007* 
(.006) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Owner shr -.006*** -.005* -.012 .026 .000 .000 .001 .000 -.012*** -.011*** 
(.002) (.002) (.124) (.158) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Owner exp .032 -.040 .060 .035 .148** .187*** .243*** .293*** .289*** .327*** 
(.175) (.194) (.071) (.088) (.074) (.070) (.091) (.010) (.069) (.072) 
Firm C. 
Age .022 .012 -.015* -.016 .026*** .024*** .028*** .025*** .068*** .061*** 
(.014) (.015) (.008) (.010) (.010) (.009) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.007) 
Size .005 .004 .004*** 
.006**
* .032 .030 .020 .020 -.011 -.100 
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.002) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.006) (.006) 
Org .036 -.027 .172** .135 .147* .099 .217*** .204** .249*** .201*** 
(.114) (-.126) (.069) (.087) (.082) (.079) (.076) (.081) (.066) (.071) 
Privtz .008 .037 -.215* -.279* 
(.127) (.125) (.129) (.146) 
Ros (lagged) -.128 -.119 .133 .083 
(.089) (.086) (.164) (.176) 
Control V. 
Prd -.172* -.096 
(.088) (.091) 
Ind. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reg. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Const .067 -0.196 1.291*** 1.360*** .238 .190 -.102 -.135 .748*** .546** 
(.463) (.501) (-.307) (-.402) (.354) (.343) (.303) (.328) (.253) (.268) 
N 997 860 1865 1252 1707 1819 2135 1896 6302 5666 
pseudo R2 .047 .047 .037 .038 .113 .114 .116 .139 .125 .130 
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Table 5: OLS Regression on Bank Loan over Equity Ratio 
 
2000 2006 2010 Pooled 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Owner chrtcs 
CPC membr .072 .403*** .316* 
(.076) (.145) (.184) 
PC membr .507*** .551*** .740*** 
(.087) (.154) (.203) 
CPC * prd .345*** 
(.100) 
PC * membr .678*** 
(.114) 
Gender -.170 -.058 -.279 -.342 -.059 -.194 -.282** -.392*** 
(.117) (.136) (.220) (.210) (.277) (.285) (.137) (.145) 
Edu -.025** -.025* .034 .045* .047 .053 .023 .033* 
(.013) (.015) (.028) (.027) (.036) (.037) (.017) (.018) 
Age -.008* -.011** -.027*** -.021** -.021* -.019 -.016*** -.015** 
(.004) (.005) (.009) (.009) (.012) (.012) (.006) (.006) 
Owner shr -.216* -.206 .001 .001 .003 .002 .001 .001 
(.118) (.145) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) 
Owner exp .051 .126 .363** .421*** .421 .585** .228** .336*** 
(.069) (.081) (.149) (.140) (.259) (.270) (.098) (.103) 
Firm chrtcs 
Age -.020** -.027*** .042** .036* .103*** .093*** .059*** .053*** 
(.008) (.009) (.020) (.019) (.021) (.022) (.010) (.010) 
Size .023*** .017* .047*** .041*** .027*** .023*** .031*** .028*** 
(.008) (.010) (.007) (.007) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.004) 
Org .141** .101 .296* .274* .383* .310 .327*** .267** 
(.070) (.083) (.169) (.163) (.231) (.241) (.101) (.109) 
Privtz .034 .075 -.462 -.554 
(.250) (.246) (.369) (.397) 
ROS .075 .066 -1.119** -1.096** 
(.179) (.172) (.516) (.531) 
Control vars 
Prd -.934*** -.802*** 
(.174) (.183) 
Ind. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reg. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Const 1.531*** 1.201*** -.505 -.873 -1.287 -1.347 .222 -.084 
(.309) (.371) (.712) (.688) (.899) (.938) (.381) (.407) 
N 1031 726 1715 1827 1922 1733 4980 4571 




Table 6: Party-member owners and their firms’ performance (ROE) 
  
1995 2000 2006 2010 Pooled 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Owner C.           
CPC membr -.119  .012  .013  -.001  -.006  
(.152)  (.034)  (.031)  (.036)  (.022)  
PC membr  -.003  -.077  .009  -.049  -.035 
 (.201)  (.044)  (.036)  (.042)  (.023) 
Gender .081 .072 .121*** .122** .075* .054 .087* .102** .086*** .089*** 
(.143) (.150) (.046) (.057) (.042) (.041) (.047) (.049) (.027) (.028) 
Edu -.037** -.044** -.005 -.007 .009 .005 .008 .015** .007* .008** 
(.018) (.020) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.007) (.007) (.004) (.004) 
Age -.006 -.008 -.001 .001 .000 -.001 -.003 -.003 -.001 -.001 
(.005) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Owner shr -.004* -.005* .086* .023 .001 .000 .001 .000 .001*** .001* 
(.002) (.002) (.046) (.059) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) 
Owner exp .164 .221 .007 -.016 -.024 -.036 -.052 -.063 -.030 -.040* 
(.171) (.187) (.026) (.033) (.030) (.029) (.049) (.050) (.021) (.022) 
Firm C.           
Age .066*** .066*** -.003 -.002 -.005 -.004 -.005 -.004 -.005** -.003 
(.013) (.015) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) 
Size .000 .001 .009*** .011*** .005*** .006*** .007*** .007*** .007*** .007*** 
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Org -.328*** -.412*** .008 .024 -.051 -.063* -.155*** -.158*** -.079*** -.078*** 
(.109) (.121) (.027) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.041) (.042) (.021) (.022) 
Privtz     -.126** -.140*** -.021 -.025   
    (.051) (.051) (.070) (.075)   
Land -.026 -.031 .002 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.000   
(.096) (.104) (.028) (.034) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)   
Loan & (C)PC           
Bank Loan -.176 -.058 -.021 -.026 .171*** .115*** .080*** .064*** .093*** .081*** 
(.137) (.143) (.021) (.026) (.013) (.011) (.009) (.009) (.006) (.006) 
Loan*CPC .314  .046  -.077***  .020  -.006  
(.324)  (.043)  (.018)  (.012)  (.009)  
Loan*PC  -.558  .042  .029  .051***  .036*** 
 (.506)  (.051)  (.019)  (.015)  (.011) 
Control V.           
Yr. Eff.         Yes Yes 
Ind. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reg. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Const 
 
1.634*** 1.802*** .192 .153 .097 .265** .335** .208 .249*** .131 
(.455) (.496) (.123) (.152) (.139) (.135) (.160) (.165) (.080) (.093) 
N 799 707 808 568 1594 1696 1996 1815 4722 4344 





Table 7: Logit Regressions on Whether the Firm Distributed Dividends 
 
1995 2000 2006 2010 Pooled 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Owner C. 
CPC membr -.066 .204* .181** .186*** .250*** 
(.122) (.112) (.075) (.063) (.065) 
PC membr .140 .159 -.026 .360*** .292*** 
(.164) (.141) (.083) (.077) (.077) 
Gender .098 .089 -.189 -.272 -.066 -.098 .038 -.013 .020 -.040 
(.129) (.135) (.159) (.202) (.102) (.099) (.084) (.089) (.085) (.090) 
Edu .000 -.009 .033* .015 -.033** -.032** -.017 -.024* -.006 -.021* 
(.017) (.018) (.018) (.022) (.014) (.013) (.012) (.013) (.011) (.012) 
Age .000 -.003 -.005 .000 -.003 -.002 -.011*** -.010*** -.008** -.007* 
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.007) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Owner shr .000 -.001 -.671*** -.657*** -.008*** -.008*** -.002** -.004*** -.006*** -.007*** 
(.002) (.002) (.176) (.215) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Owner exp -.088 -.092 .082 .099 -.077 -.020 .173* .266*** .074 .132* 
(.160) (.173) (.102) (.127) (.077) (.072) (.090) (.095) (.074) (.077) 
Firm C. 
Age .020* .011 -.009 -.024* .009 .005 .012* .006 .014** .005 
(.012) (.013) (.012) (.014) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Size .004 .004 .013 -.001 .002 .003 .005*** .003* .000 .000 
(.003) (.003) (.013) (.015) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.000) (.000) 
Org -.023 -.027 .339*** .357*** .088 .147* -.028 -.005 .208*** .217*** 
(.103) (.112) (.100) (.124) (.084) (.081) (.075) (.081) (.068) (.073) 
Privtz .012 .040 .201 .076 
(.134) (.132) (.130) (.142) 
Control V. 
Yr Eff. Yes Yes 
Ind. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reg. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Const -.542 -.227 .182 -.007 .986*** .945*** .529* .646** .390 .717** 
(.421) (.453) (.457) (.557) (.340) (.330) (.292) (.312) (.281) (.296) 








Table 8: 2SLS regressions for bank loan over equity 
(a) Second stage regression  (b) First stage regression 
 2006 2010   2006 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  Dep.V (1) CPC (2) PC (3) CPC (4) PC 
Owner C.      Owner C.     
CPC  2.762***  5.393***   Gender -.033 .067** -.099*** .029 
membr (.596)  (1.502)    (.037) (.032) (.036) (.035) 
PC  4.358***  4.611***  Edu .004 .004 .011** .005 
membr  (.942)  (1.193)   (.005) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Gender -.192 -.507* .500 -.253  Age .009*** .002* .010*** .004** 
 (.259) (.271) (.385) (.338)   (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Edu .011 .015 -.046 -.001  Owner -.001** .000 -.001** .001* 
 (.032) (.034) (.052) (.046)  shr (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Age -.056*** -.036*** -.071*** -.036**  Owner .237*** -.001 .166*** .033 
 (.012) (.011) (.022) (.016)  exp (.0257) (.022) (.034) (.034) 
Owner .003 .000 .012*** .003  Firm C.     
shr (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004)  Age -.003 .002 -.006* .011*** 
Owner -.267 .347** -.424 .456   (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
exp (.233) (.174) (.412) (.315)  Size -.001 .008*** -.000 .002*** 
Firm C.       (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Age .038* .017 .115*** .031  Privtz .094** -.103*** .151*** .101** 
 (.022) (.024) (.028) (.031)   (.042) (.038) (.047) (.048) 
Size .041*** .002 .023*** .008  ROS(’07) .010 -.056* .096 .107 
 (.008) (.013) (.006) (.007)   (.030) (.027) (.069) (.067) 
Org .047 .050 -.183 -.131  Org .004 .011 .053 .069** 
 (.205) (.215) (.333) (.322)   (.030) (.027) (.033) (.032) 
Privtz -.385 .296 -1.527*** -1.230**  Ins.V.     
 (.291) (.301) (.538) (.484)  Party org .285*** .190*** .165*** .199*** 
ROS(’07) .041 .267 -1.642** -1.687**   (.026) (.023) (.026) (.026) 
 (.203) (.219) (.691) (.665)  Control     
Control      Ind. eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes  Reg. eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reg. eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes  Const -.190 .054 -.230* -.153 
Const .591 -.552 .384 -.270   (.122) (.109) (.121) (.120) 
 (.834) (.856) (1.239) (1.164)  Wald test stats 16.51 17.33 12.56 11.22 
N 1523 1614 1648 1480       









Table 9: Veteran CPC-member owners & access to bank loan, 06 










from Big 4 bank loan from Big 4 bank loan 
CPC membr .527*** .445*** 
(.141) (.155) 














from Big 4 bank loan from Big 4 bank loan 
CPC membr 2.980*** 2.885*** 
(.570) (.617) 
PC membr 4.450*** 4.614*** 
(.886) (1.006) 
 
Notes: Estimations were conducted with the full set of the explanatory variables used in Table 7 but presented without the 
results on the other variables for the sake of the space. In 2SLS, as in Table 7, party organization was used as an 
















Table 10: Logit Regressions on Whether the Firm has Informal Loans 
 
1995 2000 2006 Pooled 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Owner chrcts 
CPC membr .110 .035 -.022 .078 
(.132) (.077) (.124) (.102) 
PC membr .207 -.036 .017 -.008 
(.178) (.094) (.136) (.123) 
Gender -.248 -.196 -.235** -.275** -.119 -.083 -.409*** -.402** 
(.162) (.168) (.104) (.127) (.191) (.175) (.144) (.161) 
Edu .032* .034 .000 -.017 -.045** -.051** .000 -.018 
(.019) (.021) (.009) (.015) (.023) (.022) (.014) (.018) 
Age .017*** .015** -.009** -.009* -.002 -.002 -.001 -.000 
(.006) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.008) (.007) (.005) (.006) 
Owner shr -.002 -.000 -.467*** -.381** .002 .002 -.001 .001 
(.002) (.003) (.117) (.148) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) 
Owner exp .095 .235 .172** .160* .342*** .316*** .299*** .315*** 
(.166) (.175) (.068) (.084) (.126) (.115) (.095) (.111) 
Firm chrcts 
Age -.026* -.026* .000 .010 -.028* -.024* -.021* -.014 
(.015) (.016) (.008) (.010) (.015) (.014) (.011) (.013) 
Size -.001 -.001 -.031*** -.016 .000 .000 .000 .000 
(.004) (.004) (.010) (.012) (.006) (.006) (.001) (.001) 
Org -.043 -.025 .027 .092 .231 .182 .081 .167 
(.115) (.126) (.067) (.084) (.147) (.137) (.089) (.105) 
Privtz .140 .130 
(.192) (.190) 
Control vars   
Yr Eff. Yes Yes 
Ind. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reg. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Const -1.562*** -1.971*** .508* .390 -1.104** -1.021* -1.305*** -1.656*** 
(.464) (.512) (.289) (.382) (.561) (.537) (.457) (.525) 
N 1135 966 1824 1227 2027 2178 5044 4426 






Table 11: Who Has Applied for Joining the Party? 
 
 
2006 2010 Pooled 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Firm perf 
ROS (t-1) .447* .024 .559** 
(.247) (.158) (.257) 
ROS (t-2) -.043 -.217 -.546*** 
(.112) (.173) (.167) 
ROS (2000) .087 -.198 
(.112) (.205) 
Owner chrtcs 
Gender .253** .218* .220* -.111 -.100 -.050 .009 
(.119) (.114) (.114) (.092) (.095) (.099) (.127) 
Edu .070*** .075*** .075*** -.008 -.008 -.008 .031* 
(.018) (.017) (.017) (.014) (.014) (.015) (.019) 
Age -.007 -.005 -.005 -.017*** -.018*** -.016*** -.027*** 
(.006) (.006) (.007) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.006) 
Owner shr -.003* -.003 -.002 -.003** -.003** -.003** -.004** 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.0011) (.001) (.001) (.002) 
Owner exp .120 .084 .092 -.205 -.172 -.246* -.032 
(.102) (.098) (.098) (.139) (.139) (.146) (.143) 
Firm chrtcs 
Age .019* .014 .019* -.017** -.014* -.015* -.009 
(.011) (.012) (.010) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.012) 
Size .004 .003 .004 .001 .001 -.001 .001 
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) 
Org -.330*** -.313*** -.292*** .044 .032 .074 -.197* 
(.102) (.098) (.099) (.083) (.086) (.090) (.112) 
Privtz .151 .114 .141 -.113 -.091 -.218 .047 
(.223) (.219) (.221) (.231) (.235) (.250) (.159) 
Control vars 
Yr Eff.       Yes 
Ind. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reg. Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Const -1.300*** -1.343*** -1.478*** 1.229*** 1.302*** 1.212*** 1.682*** 
(.441) (.442) (.427) (.335) (.343) (.363) (.472) 
N 1279 1363 1361 1421 1355 1240 2548 






Table A1: Definition of variables  
 Variables Definition 
Dependent 
variable 
Bank loan A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has bank loans at 
the time of the survey and equals to zero if otherwise 
Bank loan/ 
Equity 
The ratio of the bank loans to total equity of the firm in the survey 
year 
ROE the return over equity of the firm in the survey year 
Dividends a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm distributed 
dividends in the previous year and equals to zero if otherwise 
CPC 
application 
a dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur has 
submitted an application to join CPC (2006 survey) or has the 
desire to join CPC (2010 survey) at the time of survey and equals 







a dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur of the 




a dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur of the 
firm is a PC member at the time of the survey and equals to zero 
if otherwise. 
Gender a dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur is a 
female and equals to zero if otherwise 
Education the total schooling years of the entrepreneur 
Age the age of the entrepreneur at the time of the survey 
Owner share the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur in total shares 
Owner 
experience 
a dummy variable that equals to one if the entrepreneur once 
worked as a civil servant or a manager of a SOE firm, or, served 
in army before he/she started this business and equals to zero if 
otherwise. 
Independent 
variable – firm 
characteristics 
Age the age of the firm at the time of the survey 
Size the total sales of the firm in the survey year 
Organization a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is a limited 
liability company and equals to zero if otherwise 
Privatization a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm was privatized 
from a State-owned enterprise and equals to zero if otherwise 
ROS the return over sales of the firm 
Independent 
variable – other 
characteristics 
CPC branch a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has a CPC branch 
at the time of survey 
Informal 
loan 
a dummy that equals to one if the firm has borrowed from 
informal lending at the time of survey and equals to zero if 
otherwise (only for 1995, 2000, 2006). 
 
 
 
